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 “Today I sign the most far-reaching reforms of American 
business practices since the time of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt.  This new law sends very clear messages that all 
concerned must heed.  This law says to every dishonest 
corporate leader: you will be exposed and punished; the era 
of low standards and false profits is over; no boardroom in 
America is above or beyond the law”- George W. Bush 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the initial separation of corporate ownership from corporate 
management, the abuse of power by management has been a concern.  Early in the 
last century a small number of Industrialists owned and controlled the major 
corporations.  Slowly, as these individuals aged and retired, their vast holdings 
were transferred to a large number of decedents who were, for the most part, 
disinterested in managing the firms in which they held an ownership share.  The 
shareholders relied on experienced managers to direct their corporations.  This 
transfer of power gave rise to agency problems wherein the agent of the 
organization (manager) is likely to place their own interest above those of the actual 
owners of the firm.  There is a vast body of literature addressing the issues of 
agency problems and clearly defined Agency Theory to which the majority of 
scholars subscribe (Van Ness, Miesing, and Kang, 2009) 
 The original attempt to create an antidote to agency problems was the 
formation of corporate boards of directors (Van Ness and Seifert, 2007).  These 
directors were given the legal authority to oversee executive decision-making and 
strategic actions.  Nevertheless, they have demonstrated a lack of enthusiasm or 
motivation to effectively oversee management decisions and actions.  Proactive 
boards, those that are conscientious about their fiduciary responsibilities and fulfill 
them, effectively represent a small minority of corporate boards.  On the other 
hand, sedate boards, those that inadvertently enable executive excess, represent the 
vast majority of boards (Van Ness and Seifert, 2007).   
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 The United States congress deliberated the issues of carelessness, excesses, 
and greed within the business community and as an antidote to the problem, 
introduced the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act takes a stringent 
approach on the criminalization of white-collar crime and the prevention of 
financial distress and scandals within public companies and public accounting 
firms.  The Act has been criticized as excessively intrusive, too expensive to 
implement, and ineffective.  Nevertheless, others believe it may be the last best 
hope for stemming the tide of careless corporate decision-making, management 
excesses, and executive greed. 
 
UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR WITHIN CORPORATIONS 
 
Corporate executives associated with scandals often act with arrogance and 
frequently portray a sense of invincibility.  This sense of invincibility has resulted in 
some of the most astonishing “cover up” fraud in the history of corporate America 
over the past several decades involving such high-profile companies as Enron, Tyco, 
WorldCom, and Arthur Andersen (Giroux, 2008).  Decisions and courses of action 
taken by executives acting in unethical ways resulted in the collapse of companies, 
the loss of jobs, pensions, and life savings of both employees and investors.  
Common themes of the companies involved included the executives’ expectations of 
being capable enough to escape repercussions and their desire to manipulate 
earnings (Giroux, 2008). 
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 In 2001, the Enron scandal took the world by storm.  Enron was one of the 
world’s largest companies at the time.  The company had over 22,000 employees and 
revenues of over $100 billion in 2000.  The company collapsed in 2001 after an 
accounting scandal was uncovered involving auditor Arthur Andersen and senior 
executives.  The scandal involved a corrupt company in various different aspects.  
The misleading, publicly released financial statements masked liabilities and debts 
through offshore accounts and misstated assets and profits.  The company deceived 
the public, investors and employees to appear more fiscally sound then the reality.  
Rockness describes the path that Enron and its employees followed as one that 
began with slight accounting adjustments that eventually developed into accounting 
fraud.  He cited personal, gain, ego and survival as possible motivation for 
employees involved (Rockness and Rockness, 2005). 
Along with accounting fraud, the investigation further revealed unethical 
behavior within the executives of the firm.  “These big companies will topple over 
from their own weight”, stated Jeffrey Skilling, former Chief Executive Officer of 
Enron.  Fearless of competitors, this quotation accurately portrays the atmosphere 
of arrogance at the top of the organization.   Enron executives had large expense 
accounts and were compensated far beyond competitors within the industry.  Over 
his 17 years with Enron Chief Executive Officer Kenneth Lay received over $250 
million in compensation from the company (Sloan, Rust, Naughton, Ordonez, and 
Ganeles, 2006).  The arrogant culture of Enron was aided by a two year increase in 
revenue of almost $70 billion from 1998 to 2000.  The statistics supported the 
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attitude of the executives.  Executive compensation within Enron’s energy services 
division was established by a market valuation formula that was influenced by 
internal estimates.  According to a former executive, this created a pressure to 
inflate contracts despite having no effect on the generation of cash.  Jeffrey Skilling 
was also responsible for instituting a policy in which employees ranked in the 
bottom 20% of the company were forced to leave.  This atmosphere created 
competition internally and in many cases caused workers to overlook potential 
errors and mistakes (Mclean, Varchaver, Helyar, Revell, and Sung, 2001). 
It was difficult for employees to notice and actively try to blow the whistle on 
fraud internally, within the atmosphere that Enron created.  This is evident with 
the treatment of a former Vice President, Sherron Watkins who attempted to bring 
the accounting situation to the attention of upper management.  She attempted to 
inform Kenneth Lay of “an elaborate accounting hoax”, before the company went 
under.  In response to her actions, Watkins was demoted 33 floors from an executive 
suite to an older office (Morse and Bower, 2003).  The tyrannical actions of the Chief 
Executive Officer included the confiscation of her hard drive and work materials.  
During her testimony to Congress, a letter was released dated two days after 
Watkins meeting with Lay, that discussed the possibility of her termination (Morse 
and Bower, 2003).  The actions of Sherron Watkins are inspiring to combatants of 
corporate fraud, yet the results are discouraging.  Instead of being rewarded, and 
attempting to fix the problem at hand, Enron and Lay pushed her away to further 
mask accounting inaccuracies.   
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Arthur Andersen was the independent auditor responsible for the financial 
statement audit of Enron.  At the time there was no significant legislation in place 
that separated the limits of public accounting firms and their duties to clients.  
Enron was both an audit and consulting client of Arthur Andersen.  This conflict of 
interests along with fears that the revenue received from the consulting practice 
could be in jeopardy, contributed to the lackadaisical standards to which the auditor 
conducted its business.  Sherron Watkins consulted a former Andersen employee 
before contacting Kenneth Lay.  After the Enron scandal there was documentation 
by Andersen employees that showed skepticism with retaining the company as a 
client due to its accounting procedures and inaccuracies but actions were never 
taken (Sloan, Isifoff, Hosenball, and Thomas, 2002).  The downfall of Enron led 
directly to the downfall of Arthur Andersen.  Arthur Andersen was one of the 
largest public accounting firms of the time period and one scandal contributed to its 
demise.  After an investigation was made public, the company tried to cover it up by 
shredding and deleting thousands of documents (Barron, L.M., 2009). 
Public accounting firms such as Arthur Andersen are responsible for the 
independent financial statement audit.  The objective of the audit is to examine the 
financial statements of the company and ensure that they are in accordance with 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) through the use of Generally 
Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS).  The importance of client independence is 
shown with the hiring of a separate company to prepare and audit already existing 
financial statements.  The accuracy of these financial statements is a foundation for 
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the confidence of all stakeholders and is guaranteed by the audit.  It is a direct 
contribution to investor confidence and must achieve “reasonable assurance” in its 
accuracy (Kueppers and Sullivan, 2010).  Auditors from Arthur Andersen along 
with the internal accounting department within Enron exploited weaknesses in 
GAAP to find loopholes and use tactics to disguise credit risks and mask the 
financial problems of the company.  Manipulations in accounting created 
approximately 3,000 special purpose entities in order to move debt off of the balance 
sheet.  The accounting of hedge and derivative transactions was inaccurate along 
with the disclosure and lack of disclosure of related party transactions (Rockness 
and Rockness, 2005).   The corruption of one company spread to the company whose 
purpose is to protect and ensure the integrity of the other.  The release of financial 
statements of all companies’, especially public ones is an extremely important task.  
The integrity of these financials is of crucial importance to investors and global 
markets.  The audited financial statements of a company are the authority for 
reliable information regarding fiscal stability. 
Enron and WorldCom were the two largest scandals in the history of the 
United States but both scandals executed fraud using different methods.  Enron 
used the complication of complex financial instruments to disguise fraud while 
WorldCom simply capitalized billions of dollars of operating expenses (Giroux, 
2008).  Similar to Enron, Andersen was the independent auditor of WorldCom until 
KPMG took over the duties.  Despite the appearance of sound financial statements 
in the 2001 annual report, investigation found an accounting error of almost $4 
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billion due in part to the double counting of revenue (Giroux, 2008).  Tyco was 
another famous scandal that illustrated unethical behavior by a corporation.  The 
conglomerate participated in accounting fraud through the financial statements of 
the multiple companies acquisitioned.  Chief executive officer Dennis Kozlowski was 
also charged with lending himself noninterest loans from the company (Giroux, 
2008).  Enron, WorldCom and Tyco are just a few examples of corporations that 
have partaken in unethical behaviors.  Although these scandals have been highly 
publicized through various media outlets, the frequency of occurrences of unethical 
practices and corruption within organizations is unidentifiable and difficult to 
measure. 
 
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 
  
The government of the United States of America has played an historical role 
in regulating facets of the economy and business sector.  This was evident in the 
late 19th and early 20th century.  Industrialization created a boom in business and 
commerce.  The era was highlighted by the monopolistic, industrial companies built 
by Carnegie, Rockefeller and Vanderbilt in steel, oil and railroads, respectively.  
Technology created a growth in the economy that caused several consequences.  The 
time period included a growth in transportation with an increase of railroad miles 
from 30,000 in 1860 to 250,000 in 1916 along with a population boom in America 
from 4 million in 1790 to 31 million 1860 to 106 million in 1920 (Blackford, 2010, 
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10).  The Industrial Revolution brought about a need for government involvement.  
Since the nature of the economic boom was sudden, the government tried to 
regulate this growth.  This regulation included the Interstate Commerce Act, 
introducing the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to regulate transportation 
industries, the Meat Inspection Act (1906), the Pure Food and Drug Act (1906) 
introducing the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Reserve Act (1913) 
introducing the Federal Reserve System (Blackford, 2010).  Similar to today, 
economic growth led to governmental intrusion and legislation such as the Sherman 
Antitrust Act. The application of this act is prevalent in America today and has 
affected major corporations including Microsoft, and The National Football League.  
The important facet of the Act was not to abolish the existence of big companies but 
to make sure they grew to their sizes and potential through “reasonable” means.  
The act was a response to the American Tobacco and Standard Oil Company whose 
methods for growth were deemed as unreasonable (Blackford, 2010). 
 In a parallel situation, the United States government was faced with 
accounting scandals involving Enron, WorldCom and Arthur Andersen.  The need 
for government regulation became evident and The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was 
a result.  On July 30, 2002, President Bush signed the act into legislation of which 
he described, “Today I sign the most far-reaching reforms of American business 
practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.  This new law sends very 
clear messages that all concerned must heed.  This law says to every dishonest 
corporate leader: you will be exposed and punished; the era of low standards and 
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false profits is over; no boardroom in America is above or beyond the law”(Bush, 
2002).  The act legislated reforms that promote corporate responsibility, improve 
financial disclosures and hinder corporate and accounting fraud.  The law birthed 
the PCAOB, or Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to regulate and 
safeguard auditing professionals and firms (SEC). 
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 was introduced to help enforce financial 
regulation and strengthen the guidelines by which companies and public accounting 
firms practice.  One of the main facets of the legislation is to directly combat the 
conflict of interest scenario that occurred when Arthur Andersen was responsible 
for both consulting and audit functions for Enron.  After the passage of Sarbanes–
Oxley public accounting firms cannot offer different services to the same client.  
Clients are rather forced to utilize different firms for advisory, audit and tax 
procedures.  This facet of Sarbanes–Oxley is a crucial one that directly combats 
careless auditing practices.   
Another crucial aspect of Sabanes-Oxley was the White-Collar Crime Penalty 
Enhancement Act of 2002 which strengthened penalties for different types of fraud 
(Harvard Law Review, 2009).  The act allows the government and regulatory bodies 
to have stricter penalties and guidelines for executives and boards that commit 
these crimes.  Before Sarbanes–Oxley sentences and penalties for white–collar 
crimes were flexible and lenient and fell on the shoulders of different governing 
bodies.  The legislation quadrupled the maximum sentences for mail and wire fraud 
(common types of fraud) and further criminalized actions that beforehand were 
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previously overseen by regulatory agencies (Harvard Law Review, 2009).  The hope 
of the legislation was that criminalizing behaviors pertaining to white-collar crime 
would be an effective deterrent.  The problem with many cases of corporate fraud 
and scandals was a lack of fear of repercussion and prosecution by the individuals 
and firms involved.   
 
SARBANES-OXLEY AND ITS’ RAMIFICATIONS 
  
The introduction of legislation as substantial as The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 had various implications that extended beyond the desired results.  The 
effectiveness of this Act has been examined through a range of publications from 
varying perspectives.  The Act was implemented out of necessity but the 
ramifications have affected firms and individuals in several ways.  One of the 
results has included a dedication of firms’ internal audit resources to compliance of 
the legislation (Schneider, 2008). Sarbanes–Oxley caused companies to devote time, 
money and resources to compliance issues.  Internal audit departments within 
companies have significantly felt the impact.  The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 has 
affected the functions for internal auditors in their work pertaining to external 
audits of internal controls and has expanded their roles in serving audit committees 
and top corporate management (Schneider, 2008).  Schneider goes on to discuss 
various surveys to qualify the effect of Sarbanes–Oxley on internal audit 
departments.  These surveys involved companies in the years from 2005 – 2007.  In 
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a 2005 survey involving 117 companies, the Chief internal audit executives stated 
their budgets planned for Sarbanes–Oxley work.  22% of the companies stated that 
over half of their budgets were scheduled for this type of compliance.  In another 
2005 survey involving 270 companies, almost 60% of the involved subjects also used 
half or more of their internal audit resources for Sarbanes–Oxley work.  In 2007, a 
study of 717 internal audit managers showed a slight decrease to 41%.  These 
studies illustrate remarkable statistics.  Internal audit departments, which have 
been a part of companies and corporations before the introduction of Sarbanes-
Oxley are now dedicating much of their resources solely for these compliance issues.  
The importance of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act has become evident to companies.   
The increase in the burden on internal audit departments correlates to a 
need for more resources including professionals with knowledge and education of 
the compliance of Sarbanes–Oxley (Schneider, 2008).  Externally, the legislation 
and accounting scandals have directly contributed to a rise in the need for 
accounting professionals within the government, regulatory bodies and public 
accounting firms.  A report by Inc.com states the increase in auditing and reporting 
procedures has caused a shortage in qualified accountants and that the prices for 
“Sarbanes-generated” audits have raised 30-50 percent (Hyman, 2011). The new 
legislation increased the need for recent college graduates who are educated within 
their accounting courses and programs on the Act.  According to the Bureau Of 
Labor Statistics, the job market for accountants and auditors is expected to grow 
significantly by 22% and create approximately 280,000 jobs from 2008-2018 (Velshi, 
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2011).   The increasing complexity of the financial world (Velshi, 2011) and rise in 
accounting fraud are reasons behind this increase.  The need for qualified 
professionals is a response to Sarbanes–Oxley.   
Sarbanes-Oxley has caused foreign companies to be hesitant to list securities 
in the United States and caused domestic companies to remain in the private 
market (Fanto, 2008).  The Act applies to all issuers including foreign private 
issuers that have registered securities under the United States Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, that are required to file reports under Section 15 (d) of the Exchange 
Act, and that have filed a registration statement under the United States Securities 
act of 1933 (Cohen and Brodsky, 2004).  These foreign companies have been directly 
affected by Sarbanes-Oxley.  The compliance issues that arise from following such a 
strong piece of legislation can prove to be costly and a direct deterrent for foreign 
investment and involvement within the domestic market.  Since the establishment 
of the Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board, the same cost-benefit 
analysis is being made by private companies considering a public offering.  The 
private sector is not affected by Sarbanes-Oxley and thus saves money and 
resources necessary to deal with its compliance. 
The increased criminalization crackdown on white-collar crime has 
introduced an era of executives being brought to justice via the United States 
Justice system.  These increased penalties, and prevalent court proceedings, are 
leaving the sentencing ofthe violators of the White-Collar Crime Penalty Act to the 
discretion of the presiding judge rather than a uniform system (Harvard Law 
 
14 
 
Review, 2009).  The author argues that in response to Sarbanes-Oxley and the 
WCCPA judges have reacted to the stronger sentences by disregarding Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines.  A disparity has been created with the sentencing of this 
type of criminal and it is diminishing the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley and the WCCPA 
as a deterrent of white-collar crime.  It has created the need for Congress to 
intervene and impose a uniform sentencing system applicable to all violators of the 
legislation (Harvard Law Review, 2009).  In many cases of white-collar crime, few 
executives come to trial but rather enter guilty pleas, becoming cooperating 
witnesses assisting the government in building cases against their former friends 
and coworkers (Brickley, 2006).  In her analysis Brickley, studied the proceedings 
and cases of many executives indicted on varying white-collar offenses.  In one 
study between March 2002 and July 2004, 87 defendants’ charges were resolved but 
the percentage determined by a jury verdict was just 10.  The rest were all entered 
into plea agreements.  These results can be contributed to usual multiple defendant 
prosecution techniques utilized by the government (Brickley, 2006) or a reflection of 
the character of the individuals involved.  The defendants’ eagerness to benefit 
themselves at the expense of another directly illustrates the reason they are in the 
criminal proceeding in the first place.   
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CONCLUSION 
  
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is a landmark legislative representation, 
born out of necessity to curb executive greed and establish preventative measures 
against the downfall of American corporations through accounting scandals that 
send resonating effects through the whole economy.   The recession of the 2000s, 
illustrates the results of the demise of major corporations due to fraud and 
lackadaisical regulation and restriction by governing agencies.  As with most pieces 
of legislation, there are advocates and critics whose sides both have evidence to 
support their cases.  Despite the varying effects of Sarbanes-Oxley and the 
stringent policies and resources it is costing domestic and foreign companies, the 
social value of the Act is the prevailing factor (Fanto, 2007,08).  The law is designed 
to successfully curtail the atmosphere of arrogance and invincibility illustrated by 
the officers and directors of Wall Street before the Sarbanes–Oxley implementation.  
Increased criminal liabilities prevent executives from placing blame solely on 
employees below their pay grades and rank (Fanto, 2008).  The days of blatant 
passiveness to fraud and misstatements in accounting procedures are slowly coming 
to an end, and Sarbanes-Oxley is responsible.  The reaches of this milestone 
legislation, offset the fiscal burden it has placed on companies.       
 
  
 
16 
 
References 
Barron, L.M., “Right To Counsel Denied: Corporate Crimminal Prosecutions, 
 Attorney Fee Agreements, And The Sixth Amendment,” Emory Law Journal, 
 58 (5), 1265-1304 
 
Blackford, M., “American Manufacturing, 1850-1939: A Business History 
 Approach,” OAH Magazine Of History, 24 (1), 2010, 17-22 
 
Brickley, K., “In Enron’s Wake: Corporate Executives On Trial,” Journal Of  
  Criminal Law &Criminology, 2006, 96 (2), 397-433 
 
Cohen, A., and Brodsky, D., “The US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: What Audit 
 Committees Of Non-US Issuers Need To Know,” International Journal Of 
 Disclosure & Governance, 2004, 1 (4), 313-323 
 
Fanto, J., “a Social Defense Of Sarbanes-Oxley,” New York Law School Law review, 
 2008, 52 (4), 517-532 
 
Giroux, G., “What Went Wrong? Accounting Fraud And Lessons From The Recent 
 Scandals.” Social Research, 75 (4), 2008, 1205-1238 
Hyman, G., “Sarbanes-Oxley And The New Accountant,” (http://www.online-
 education.net/articles/business/sarbanes-oxley-accountant.html), 2011 
Kueppers, R., and Sullivan, K., “How And Why An Independent Audit Matters,” 
  International Journal Of Disclosure And Governance, 7 (4), 2010, 286-293 
Mclean, B., Varchaver, N., Helyar, J., Revell, J., and Sung, J., “ Why Enron Went 
 Bust,”  Fortune, 144 (13), 2001 
Morse, J., and Bower, A., “The Party Crasher,” Time, 160 (27/1), 2003, 52 
Rockness, H., and Rockness, J., “Legislated Ethics: From Enron to Sarbanes-Oxley, 
  The Impact  On Corporate America,” Journal Of Business Ethics, 57 (1), 
 2005, 31-54 
Sloan, A., Isikoff, M., Hosenball, M., and Thomas, R., “The Enron Effect,”  
  Newsweek, 139 (4), 2002, 34 
Sloan, A., Rust, C., Naughton, K., Ordonez, J., and Ganeles, J., “Laying Enron To 
  Rest,” Newsweek, 147 (23), 2006 
Unknown Author, “Go Directly To Jail: White Collar Sentencing After The  
  Sarbanes-Oxley Act,” Harvard Law Review, 2009, 122 (6), 1728-1749 
 
17 
 
Van Ness, R., Miesing, P., and Kang, J., “Understanding Governance And Corporate 
  Boards: Is Theory A Problem?,” European Journal Of Management, 7 (9), 
 2009, 196-199 
Van Ness, R., and Seifert, C., “Boards Of Directors And Corporate Performance: 
  And Analysis Model,” Review Of Business Research, 7 (3), 2007, 11-21 
Velshi, a., “Today’s ‘It’ Jobs: Accounting And IT,” Money, 40 (1), 2011, 42 
  
